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A Note on Approximate Revenue Maximization with
Two Items
Ron Kupfer ∗
Abstract
We consider the problem of maximizing revenue when selling 2 items to a single
buyer with known valuation distributions. In [1], Hart and Nisan showed that selling
each item separately using the optimal Myerson’s price, gains at least half of the
revenue attainable by optimal auction for two items. We show that in case the items
have different revenues when sold separately the bound can be tightened.
1 Introduction
Following Hart and Nisan work in [1] we are looking at the scenario of a single seller sell-
ing multiple items to a single buyer. This paper is limited to the case of two items with
independently distributed values and an additive valuation. The distributions (given by a
cumulative distribution F ) are known to the seller but not the chosen valuations.
For one item the problem is completely solved by Myerson’s classic result [2]. If the seller
offer to sell it for a price p then the probability that the buyer will buy is 1− F (p), and the
revenue will be p ·(1−F (p)). The seller will choose a price p∗ that maximizes this expression.
Myerson’s characterization of optimal auctions concludes that the take-it-or-leave-it offer at
the above price p∗ yields the optimal revenue among all mechanisms. Myerson’s result also
applies when there are multiple buyers, in which case p∗ would be the reserve price in a
second price auction.
Hart and Nisan showed that selling each item separately using the optimal Myerson’s
price, gains at least half of the revenue attainable by optimal auction for two items.
In addition, they showed that when the items valuations are drown from two i.i.d distri-
bution the ratio between the revenues is tighter and stand on at least 73%.
We show that on the other hand, when the two distributions of the values correspond to
two different revenues (when selling each item separately) the revenue ratio is again grater
then half. Thus, covering another set of distributions.
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1
Notations and Preliminaries
Mechanisms
• x = (x1, ..., xk) - buyer valuation getting each item.
• q(x) = (q1, ..., qk) - denotes the probability that item i is allocated to the buyer when
his valuation is x
• s(x) = (s1, ..., sk) - denotes the expected payment that the seller receives from the
buyer when the buyers valuation is x
• b(x) = (b1, ..., bk) - denotes the utility of the buyer when his valuation is x, i.e., b(x) =
x · q(x)− s(x)
• IR - Individually Rational - b(x) ≥ 0 for all x
• IC - Incentive Compatible - for all x, x′: x · q(x)− s(x) ≥ x · q(x′)− s(x′)
Revenue
For a cumulative distribution F on Rk+ (for k ≥ 1), we consider the optimal revenue ob-
tainable from selling k items to a (single, additive) buyer whose valuation for the k items is
jointly distributed according to F :
• Rev(F ) is the maximal revenue obtainable by any incentive compatible and individually
rational mechanism.
• SRev(F ) is the maximal revenue obtainable by selling each item separately.
2 Result
Theorem 1. For every one-dimensional distributions F1 and F2,(
2−
α− 1− ln(α)
1 + α
)
SRev(F1 × F2) ≥ Rev(F1 × F2)
where α = max {Rev(F1)
Rev(F2)
,
Rev(F2)
Rev(F1)
}
From now on we denote Ri = Rev(Fi). w.l.o.g. we assume that R1 ≥ R2 and denote
R1
R2
as α (≥ 1).
Lemma 1. Let A, B be two items with value distributions X and Y associated with SRev
of R1, R2 respectively. R1 +R2 + E(min{X, Y }) ≥ Es(X, Y )
Proof. we use a similar technique to the one used in appendix A in [1]. Take any IC and IR
mechanism (q, s). We will split its expected revenue into two parts, according to which one
of X and Y is maximal: E(s(X, Y )) ≤ E(s(X, Y )1X≥Y ) + E(s(X, Y )1Y≥X)
2
for every fixed value y of Y define a mechanism (q˜y, s˜y) for X by q˜y(x) := q1(x, y) and
s˜y(x) := s(x, y) − yq2(x, y) for every x (so the buyers payoff remains the same: b˜
y(x) =
b(x, y)).
The mechanism (q˜y, s˜y) is IC and IR for X , since (q, s) was IC and IR for (X, Y ) (only
the IC constraints with y fixed, i.e., (x, y) vs. (x, y), matter). We do the same for (q˜x, s˜x).
Therefore,
R1 ≥ Ex∼X(S
y
1 (x)) ≥ E(S
y
1 (x)1x≥y) ≥ E((s(x, y)− y)1X≥y) (1)
R2 ≥ Ey∼Y (S
x
2 (y)) ≥ E(S
x
2 (y)1y≥x) ≥ E((s(x, y)− x)1Y≥x) (2)
summing equations 1, 2 and taking expectation over X, Y we get:
R1 +R2 ≥ Es(X, Y )− E(Y 1X≥Y +X1Y≥X) = Es(X, Y )− E(min{X, Y }) (3)
Lemma 2. E(min{X, Y }) ≤ (2 + ln(α))R2
Proof.
E(min{X, Y }) =
∫ ∞
0
F¯1(u)F¯2(u)du
≤
∫ R2
0
1 · du+
∫ R1
R2
R2
u
du+
∫ ∞
R1
R1R2
u2
du = R2 +R2 ln
(
R1
R2
)
+
R1R2
R1
= R2(2 + ln
(
R1
R2
)
)
combining the lemmas we get that
Es(X, Y ) ≤ R1 + (3 + ln(
R1
R2
))R2
=
(
2−
α− 1− ln(α)
1 + α
)
(R1 +R2)
thus, finishing the proof of Theorem 1.
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